

## **Soc 131: Social Science Inquiry (Autumn Quarter)**

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Tuesday and Thursday 9:30-10:50

This class introduces social scientific inquiry, focusing on political economy. We will develop skills in formal modeling, data analysis, and social scientific reasoning to reevaluate these important public policy problems.

Students with more math background may enjoy the following:

[Rapoport, A. 1983 Mathematical Models in the Social and Behavioral Sciences.pdf](#)

For an alternative account:

<https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=KSNJGymnLG4>

There are a variety of assignments in this course, each clearly marked below on the date they are due. Students will write three short papers (2 pages each) and one longer paper (5 pages) during the quarter. Hard copies of papers are due in class on the assigned dates. Late papers (without prior permission for extensions) will be penalized one grade per day late. We will also be completing R and formal theory exercises. These are due in hard copy form. Class grades will be 60% the papers (15% each), 20% the completed exercises (5% each) as well as 20% class participation. The class participation grade will be based on active participation in class and submissions on the discussion pages on Canvas.

Class Resources:

In this class we will develop skills in R, a free software for statistical analysis, available on the CRAN website. All other assignments are available on the course canvas site.

Office hour sign up (Tuesday 10:50-12) here: <https://www.wejoinin.com/sheets/yjexr>

## TOOLS OF POLITICAL ECONOMY

### **Class 1 (Sept 28): Introduction**

[PattyPenn2019\\_AV.pdf](#) [Read sections 1-3]

[Halmos\\_NaiveSetTheory.pdf](#) pg 1-33

### **Class 2 (Sept 30): Theories of utility**

Gintis *Decision Theory and Human Behavior* Chapter 1, 2009

[GintisChapter1.pdf](#)

Arrow, Kenneth, *Social Choice and Individual Values* Chapter 1, 2.

### **Class 3 (Oct 5): Arrow's Impossibility Theorem**

Arrow, Kenneth, *Social Choice and Individual Values* Chapters 3-7

Sen, Amartya *Social Choice and Social Welfare* Chapters A1 and A1\*

[Sen1970.pdf](#)

### **Class 4 (Oct 7): Legislatures**

ASSIGNMENT:

Shepsle and Bonchek. Chapter 5 of *Analyzing Politics* "The Spatial Model"

[Shepsle\(1997\)\\_Ch5.pdf](#)

### **Class 5 (Oct 12): Theory of Collective Action and Commitment**

ASSIGNMENT: [Chapter\\_1.pdf](#)

Olson, 1965 *The logic of collective action; public goods and the theory of groups* Harvard economic studies, vol. 124, Harvard University Press, Cambridge, Mass. (1965)

[Olson1965.pdf](#)

## THEORIES OF INFLUENCE

### **Class 6 (Oct 14): Nash Equilibrium and Economic Theories of Influence**

Becker, Gary S., 1983. "A Theory of Competition Among Pressure Groups for Political Influence." *The Quarterly Journal of Economics*. 98(3): 371-400.

### **Class 7 (Oct 19): Pressure Groups and Exchange theories**

Stephen P. Magee, William A. Brock and Leslie Young. *Black Hole Tariffs and Endogenous Protection*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Chapters 2-4 [Chapters23MBY.pdf](#) [Chapter4MBY.pdf](#)

### **Class 8 (Oct 21): Pressure and Persuasion**

Bauer, Pool, and Dexter (1963) *American Business & Public Policy* "Conclusion"

Austen-Smith, David, and John R. Wright. 1994. "Counteractive Lobbying." *American Journal of Political Science* 38 (February): 25-44. [AustinSmithWright1994.pdfssi\\_conclusion.pdf](#)

### **Class 9 (October 26): Political Representation/ Principal-Agent Models**

ASSIGNMENT: Paper 3, [Chapter\\_3.pdf](#)

Madison, James, Hamilton, Alexander, and John Jay. *Federalist Papers*. No. 10. [https://www.gutenberg.org/files/1404/1404-h/1404-h.htm#link2H\\_4\\_0010](https://www.gutenberg.org/files/1404/1404-h/1404-h.htm#link2H_4_0010)

Ferejohn, J. 1986. Incumbent performance and electoral control, *Public Choice*, 50(1): 5-25. [Ferejohn \(1986\).pdf](#)

### **Class 10 (Oct 28): Representation Revisited**

Ashworth, Scott. "Electoral accountability: recent theoretical and empirical work." *Annual Review of Political Science* 15 (2012): 183-201. [Ashworth2012.pdf](#)

Schnakenberg, Keith E., and Ian R. Turner. "Signaling with Reform: How the Threat of Corruption Prevents Informed Policymaking." (2017). [SchnakenbergTurner-corruption-online-72018.pdf](#)

### **Class 11 (Nov. 2): Lobbying as Subsidy**

Hall, Richard L., and Alan V. Deardorff. "Lobbying as legislative subsidy." *American Political Science Review* 100.1 (2006): 69-84. [HallDeardorff.pdf](#)

### **Class 12 (Nov. 4): Lobbying as vote buying**

Grossman, Gene M. and Helpman, Elhanan. 1994. "Protection for Sale." *The American Economic Review* [GrossmanHelpman1994.pdf](#)

### **Class 13 (Nov. 9): Leader Quality and influence**

Dal Bó, Ernesto, Dal Bó, Pedro, and Rafael Di Tella. 2006. "“Plata O Plomo?”: Bribe and Punishment in a Theory of Political Influence." *The American Political Science Review*. 100(1): 41-53.

[Dalbo et al \(2006\).pdf](#)

## **EVIDENCE**

### **Class 14 (Nov 11): Causation**

Holland 1986 "Statistics and Causal Inference." *JASA* [HollandStatistics1986.pdf](#)

[Experimental political science and the study of causality](#) : from nature to the lab / Rebecca B. Morton, Kenneth C. Williams. Chapter 6

### **Class 15 (Nov 16): Estimating Lobbying and Influence w/ Quasi-Experiments**

ASSIGNMENT:

Carpenter, Daniel, and David A. Moss, eds. *Preventing regulatory capture: Special interest influence and how to limit it*. Cambridge University Press, 2013. Pg 57-68

[carpenter and moss \(2014\).pdf](#)

Fisman, Raymond. "Estimating the value of political connections." *American Economic Review* 91.4 (2001): 1095-1102. [Fisman \(2001\).pdf](#)

[Fisman \(2001\).pdf](#)

### **Class 16 (Nov 18): Estimating Lobbying and Influence w/ Observational Data**

Video on Regression

<https://uchicago.hosted.panopto.com/Panopto/Pages/Viewer.aspx?id=2f1488a9-6be5-4ec5-bb31-ac6c0168969b>

Bertrand, Marianne, Matilde Bombardini, and Francesco Trebbi. "Is it whom you know or what you know? An empirical assessment of the lobbying process." *American Economic Review* 104.12 (2014): 3885-3920.

Blanes i Vidal, Jordi, Mirko Draca, and Christian Fons-Rosen. "Revolving door lobbyists." *American Economic Review* 102.7 (2012): 3731-48.

### **Class 17 (Nov 30): Automated Content Analysis**

ASSIGNMENT: [Chapter\\_5.pdf](#)

Drutman, Lee, and Daniel J. Hopkins. 2013. "The Inside View: Using the Enron E-mail Archive to Understand Corporate Political Attention." *Legislative Studies Quarterly* **38**(1): 5–30.

Patty and Penn "Analyzing Big Data: Social Choice & Measurement" *PS: Political Science & Politics* 48.1 (2015): 95-101.