CONTINUITY & CHANGE
THE COLLEGE AS A MEMBER OF THE WIDER UNIVERSITY

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OCCASIONAL PAPERS ON HIGHER EDUCATION
THE COLLEGE OF THE UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO
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Last year was a good year for the College. We started the year with an expanded and very successful Orientation Week and finished it with a grand party for all graduating seniors and their parents, siblings, and other relatives at the Museum of Science and Industry the night before graduation, attended by almost 3,500 people, most of whom were in quite happy spirits. In between our students prospered; won numerous competitive fellowships, including a Rhodes and a Marshall; enjoyed the new Reynolds Club Phase I with its restored lounges, coffee bars, pool tables, working fireplaces; won various athletic distinctions; and above all, they had the privilege of studying and learning at one of the very best university-based liberal arts colleges in the United States.

To run such a college is the work of many, many devoted and dedicated people, and to the Collegiate Masters, the staff of the Dean of Students office, the Office of Admissions, and the Office of College Aid, not to mention Ted Cook, Jeff Slovak, Art Sussman, Ed Turkington, Sherry Gutman, Bill Michel, and to a legion of other colleagues, I offer my warmest and most sincere thanks. As we plan wisely for the future, as we consider ways of doing what we do even more effectively and more successfully,

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let us not forget that we have now one of the very finest liberal arts colleges in the United States.

Last year was a banner year for applications, up over 1,000 from the year before. The entering class this year—980 first-years and 58 transfer students—is stronger than ever. Reports from the field—from you who are teaching these students—are strongly positive about their ambition, their intelligence, and their love of learning. We must never forget that what this College is ultimately about is recruiting and teaching students of this caliber, students who truly want to educate themselves. I thank Ted O’Neill and the members of his staff for their work in achieving this record number of applications and in bringing in a new class of such quality and good cheer, and I thank Jean Treese and her Orientation staff, including the hundreds of College students who served as O-Aides, for their dedicated service.

On the faculty side of things we launched the first part of a two-year process of thinking about the future shape of the College’s curriculum with a very well attended two-day faculty retreat in December. The sizable group of colleagues who make up the College Curriculum Group then spent the Winter and Spring quarters thinking about basic issues of Core and concentration design. This year, during the Autumn and Winter quarters, the Curriculum Group will complete its review with a hands-on, component-by-component examination of each of the elements of the current Core programs. The goal of this review is to ask serious questions about how well the curriculum passed ten years ago has functioned and how well we anticipate it will continue to function in the next decade of our history. We will also seek to learn how well the various components fulfill the normative ideals which they espouse, and how effectively they provide our students with the kind of broad, interdisciplinary learning experience which has always been at the heart of the Chicago approach
to liberal education. During the Winter and early Spring quarters we will also have joint presentations by the Collegiate Masters and divisional Deans to the College Council on the present status and future prospects of the various concentration programs. Early in the Spring Quarter I will then reconvene the Curriculum Group and invite them to formulate proposals for strengthening the curriculum, which we will bring to the College Council for discussion, debate, and legislative action.

I am also pleased to report that the College played a substantial role in the successful completion of the Campaign for the Next Century. Thirty-seven percent of all individual gifts to the campaign came from alumni of the College, and those gifts accounted for 61 percent of the total dollars received from alumni during the campaign. And it is perhaps not too silly to mention that in the *U.S. News and World Report* rankings, we were not only ranked third in the nation in academic reputation, but also fifth in the nation in the rate of alumni giving. I am especially pleased to be able to announce that in the last three years we have managed to raise six new endowed College professorships. My goal is to double that number—that is, to raise an additional twelve chairs—over the next six years, and I am confident that this is a realistic and attainable goal. I have also found that support for student research and internships is especially attractive for potential donors to the College. Since the College seeks to increase substantially the number of these opportunities available to its students, we have also made support for them one of the College’s fund-raising priorities.

The enhancement of internship possibilities is also linked to our increasingly close collaboration with CAPS. As you know, in the past CAPS enjoyed a rather beleaguered reputation among our students and recent alums; recent surveys, self-studies, and consultants’ reports were unanimous in criticizing the level of service that CAPS provided. But with the appointment of Bob Riesman as the new Director, that profile
has quickly changed, and we have spent the last year planning several new joint initiatives. One of the most significant ventures will involve a very substantial increase in the College's program of research and policy internships in Washington, D.C. This initiative will begin to bear fruit during the 1996–97 academic year with the first competition for five new academic internships for College students at the Smithsonian Institution in the summer of 1997. It is my hope and expectation that the Chicago–Smithsonian Internship Program will become the anchor point for an expanded array of policy and practicum internships in various branches of the federal government and in other public and private agencies in our nation's capital. Closer to home, I am also pleased to announce that the College has arranged for three internships, to be filled annually, in Mayor Daley's office in Chicago as the first component of a new Mayoral Internship program. I am convinced that internships and research opportunities, like those at the Smithsonian and in Chicago city government, should be more widely available to our students and that they are an appropriate and effective way to make the College more attractive to potential students and to enrich our community's academic life, while also helping students make the transition from College to career or graduate school more effectively.

This past year also saw a serious effort on the part of the College to maintain more systematic contact with College alumni. To accomplish this we commissioned a new semiannual publication, the College Report, the second issue of which has just been published. Initial alumni reaction to the Report has been quite favorable. Over time it is my hope that the Report will give our 33,000 College alums a more accurate sense of the range of activities on campus and of the many exciting new programs designed for the welfare of our students that are now underway. A second initiative on the alumni front involved the Admissions Office. Effective August 1, we waived the application fee for children of University of Chicago
alumni when they apply for admission to the College. We did this both for practical purposes—to encourage more alumni children to consider the College—and as a symbolic expression of solidarity with those folks who should be, and typically are, our most loyal boosters.

Last year will also go down in local history as the year of the self-study. The work of Richard Taub, Susan Kidwell and her colleagues, Andy Abbott, and the folks from McKinsey all shed various streams of light on the culture of our students and ourselves. The evidence presented in these studies and reports was sometimes contradictory, but I think that there is wide agreement that we offer a splendid academic education, one that our alumni applaud and defend, but that we may be doing so in ways—sometimes intentionally, but often unintentionally—that contribute to unproductive stress and that occasionally even engender unhealthy levels of competitiveness among our students. We have also learned that we have been recruiting a number of students to the College for whom Chicago is clearly a second or third choice or even a back-up school, and that some part of the dissatisfaction expressed by our students is related to such factors. Bluntly put, we have a wonderful College, one that is marked by the capacity of colleagues to think in general terms about liberal education in ways that our peers really envy, but, along with many of our peers, we also have problems and we need to address those problems if we are to take full advantage of the bright possibilities of our future.

Finally, the year concluded with President Hugo Sonnenschein’s letter to the faculty about his aspirations for the future of the University, including his expectation that the College will grow by about 900 additional students to 4,500 by the year 2005, assuming that we can expand the applicant pool of gifted students who not only choose to apply to and then to matriculate at Chicago, but who also want the kind of education we have to offer.
A lot of activity, and it leaves us with much to think about and to ponder over the next several years.

Where are we going? Do we generally agree that we should or must go there, and can we go “there” and still be us? I thought it might be helpful if we sought the insights that can be gained from thinking about our own history in trying to make some sense of these simple questions. I therefore want to focus the rest of my remarks today on the College in the 1950s and 1960s, since the College that we now operate actually dates from that period and since, as I hope to show you, many of the concerns and worries that preoccupy us today were faced, and faced with a courageous, but also frustrated determination, by our predecessors forty years ago. I do not believe that history can teach us what to do in the future—we would really be in trouble if we believed that—but I do believe that some understanding of what worked and what didn’t work in the past may be useful to us as we weigh our options and contemplate our possibilities. What I am about to present will convey some surprises—certainly I was surprised the more I delved this summer into the archives of the College and of the central administration, as they relate to the history of the College and its relationship to the wider University.

My story comes in two parts, and it conveniently divides into what I shall term the Kimpton Era and the Beadle-Levi Era. Both eras manifested an interesting combination of several different variables: a pronounced concern with the structure and curriculum of the College; an equally pronounced concern with governance issues involving divisional-College relations; an extraordinary effort to rebuild the core of distinguished faculty and to put the University’s budget on more solid ground, while sustaining our basic educational values and traditions; and finally, a remarkable concern on the part of the top leadership of the University with the numerical size of the College as a powerful variable that would affect—positively or negatively—the other three issues.
nyone who reads The Idea and Practice of General Education, a book which was published in 1950 and which summarizes both the pedagogical goals and the intellectual achievements of the Hutchins College, cannot but be impressed with the thoughtfulness and coherence of the curricular vision that unfolded in the College in the later 1940s. Many of the components of that vision were in fact implemented and some continue to inform and to guide what we do today. Particularly bold was the heavy emphasis on general education as the core of what a collegiate liberal arts education should be about, a pedagogical and intellectual program that sought to develop in all students, as the College faculty argued in 1952, a “competence to exercise constructive, critical judgment upon, and to achieve some comprehensive understanding of, the diverse and particular problems, materials, and methods which they have encountered in the foundational courses of the curriculum.” The assumption that general education constituted the essence of the collegiate experience was made even more controversial by a policy decision allowing high school students to be admitted to the College after only two years of high school instruction. Writing on behalf of a committee exploring issues relating to academic orientation, Mark Ashin summarized the College thus in 1952: “The objectives of the College represent a break with the predominant currents of American life.

1. These remarks are based on research in the Presidents’ Papers, series 1952–1960; the Archive of the Dean of the College, 1926–1965; the Records of the Board of Trustees; and the Profile of the University of Chicago prepared for the Ford Foundation in 1964–65 and its supplemental materials. With the exception of the Ford Profile, the other materials are located in the Department of Special Collections, The University of Chicago Library.
They hold no promise of monetary or social success, but point only to the necessity of enlightened citizenship and the pleasures of rational living.”

It was, however, the profound misfortune of the colleagues who sponsored and who in many cases devoted much of their professional careers to sustain this revolutionary concept of undergraduate education to run up against several, almost impenetrable barriers to their success. The first involved a serious decline in the enrollment level of the College that had become apparent by the early 1950s. Part of this decline arose from the resistance of the high schools to releasing their most promising students before graduation, which, in turn, caused recruiting difficulties for the College at a time when approximately 25 to 30 percent of our students came to the College before finishing high school (the class of 1953 was over 40 percent in this category). This is clear from Lawrence Kimpton’s comments before a group of Chicago-area high school principals in October 1953 where Kimpton admitted, with considerable candor, that

[w]e began college two years earlier than the other schools in the nation, and—nobody came. Really, I can’t blame them. If I were a high school principal, I wouldn’t want to cut myself in two by sending my best students off to college when they were through with their sophomore year.

At the same time, but in quite an ironically inverted manner, the reputation of the College as an extremely demanding and intense place also limited the admissions pool, since, as a faculty committee investigating the College’s enrollment decline learned in 1952: “High school principals on occasion have told our representatives that there was no one in their student body of the quality required to succeed in the College.” On the face of it both propositions—high school resistance and high school
intimidation—seem contradictory, but in fact there is no reason to doubt that both variables were operative.

Accompanying the admissions problem was also the perception that the Chicago degree was devalued or at least undervalued by the outside world, even for those who entered after finishing high school. According to Kimpton, this meant that many Chicago students were forced to obtain additional specialized training before the outside world credited them with having actually achieved a four-year college education. Again, in Kimpton’s own words:

. . . this was only the beginning of the complications. We found that 90 percent of our students went on after achieving the AB. We had anticipated that the [Chicago] AB would be a terminal degree, but students seemed to consider specialization necessary. At that point, this began to happen. Other colleges would admit our students—*but at the junior level*. Of course we protested. . . . But the University of Chicago required three years of work for a Masters degree [beyond the College’s AB], and when we protested, the other schools pointed this out, saying ‘but you are treating them like juniors!’

Lest one think that Kimpton was alone in this assessment, the faculty committee on enrollment in 1952, chaired by Richard Bruère, argued that “there are some penalties that must be suffered by the pioneering institution along with the rewards that it enjoys. Prospective students are often concerned about the marketability of their degree, should they transfer to another institution.”

Even more devastating was the virtual meltdown of the neighborhood surrounding the University in the later 1940s and early 1950s, which
made Chicago seem an unsafe and inhospitable destination for high
school students, whether they were sixteen or eighteen years of age. The
problem of neighborhood deterioration became so severe that by 1953
Woodlawn had become the site of one of the highest rates of violent
crime in the city. The neighborhood issue was important not only
because of its effects on the general milieu of the University, but because
in the early 1950s we were much less an on-campus residential college
than today, and trouble in the neighborhood meant direct trouble in
student life as well.

The net result of both factors could be charted in the fact that by
the autumn of 1953 enrollment in the College had sunk to less than 1,350
students. The entering class in that year—275 first-year and 39 transfer
students—was less than half of what it had been twenty years earlier.

And, equally significant, in spite of (or perhaps because of) the
growing independence of the College’s faculty and its success in creating
a veritable master plan for general education, many faculty members whose
primary appointments were in the divisions manifested considerable
skepticism about a curriculum that seemed to claim that a first-rate liberal
arts education should consist primarily of general education sequences
and their attendant comprehensive exams. Arguing that the College and
its faculty had allowed themselves to become too divorced from the rest of
the University, they asked, indeed they even demanded, that opportunities
for more specialized study be given greater weight and prominence in
our students’ bachelor’s programs.

The perceived crisis in undergraduate enrollments was accompanied,
moreover, by a second and perhaps more ominous crisis experienced by
the wider University. At its core lay the truly parlous state of University
finances. By 1950–51 (the final academic year of Robert Hutchins’s
tenure), the University was running a budget deficit of $1.2 million on
a regular budget base of $11.3 million. That amounted to a budget deficit of over 10 percent, a situation which Larry Kimpton described to the Board of Trustees as having been chronic since 1938. In 1953 Kimpton told the Budget Committee of the Board that “our problem is simple of explanation if not solution. In the last eight years we have spent more money that we should have,” and a year later he added that “We are working as hard as we possibly can and yet we are continually running up against this blank wall of the need for money.”

And both the plight of the neighborhood and the grimness of the budget had powerful negative consequences on the quality of the faculty. It is striking to read the list of the names of very distinguished senior faculty who left the University for appointments at other institutions throughout the 1950s; by the end of the decade many of our departments seemed near to demoralization. For example, my own department, History, made no less than twelve outside offers to senior faculty in the course of the 1950s, and all of them were turned down.

In response to both of these perceived crises—a College with a brilliant curricular tradition but with a demographic basis which seemed at odds with the general trends in American higher education and with a curriculum that many colleagues in the graduate departments found too privileging of general education; and a University that was hemorrhaging money and losing some of its most stellar faculty, all the while being located in a police district that in 1952 had one of the highest crime rates in the City of Chicago—Lawrence Kimpton formulated aggressive and even radical solutions. I will leave aside Kimpton’s work with the neighborhood, for that would require a lecture unto itself. Suffice it to say that during the 1950s the University invested approximately $29 million in neighborhood redevelopment (which is approximately $150 million in current dollars).
Kimpton began with three years of desperate budget cutting, bringing the budget into balance by 1954. But in his own words to the Board of Trustees, he had “achieved a balanced budget by tightening up in terms of salaries, staff and activities, and that we actually end up in serious danger of becoming a second-rate institution.” He further admitted that “the budget had been balanced at too high a cost to morale as well as to the standards of the University.” As Edward Levi was later to put it: “[t]he cut-backs helped to further the belief that the University was slipping academically, as indeed it was.” Kimpton’s budget slashing was the first sign of a spiral of desperation: efforts to do one important and necessary thing—live within our means—exacerbated the outflow of top faculty from the institution.

Kimpton’s second initiative was to restructure and reform the College. His dual goal was to relocate the B.A. degree by making it a joint venture between the College and the divisions, thus involving the departments in the work of collegiate education. While keeping as much of the existing general education programs as was feasible—he actually comes across in the records of the day as a strong and even eloquent defender of the basic principles of general education—Kimpton sought to balance them with an equivalent amount of specialized work in the departments. He also sought to close down slowly the existence of a separate College faculty by initiating the practice of joint appointments for new faculty and for existing divisional faculty. On the admissions front, Kimpton did not disguise the fact that he was extremely frustrated with what he called “our clumsy methods of publicizing our undergraduate work.” And it was soon apparent—and Kimpton did nothing to disguise his views—that he felt that the College had been attracting, as he once delicately put it, “too many students of a certain type.” By this Kimpton referred to students who focused exclusively on academic pursuits to the exclusion
of other kinds of social and communitarian relationships. As he would argue in 1954, Kimpton wanted the selection of matriculants to be greatly broadened “in order to make the University a healthier institution, particularly on the undergraduate level.”

Kimpton’s efforts at change came in two parts. In February 1953, Kimpton appointed a committee chaired by Emery Filbey to review the location of the B.A. degree, and Kimpton was not bashful in privately articulating to the committee his own views of what was wrong: “The present College is a four-year pattern beginning with the eleventh grade and extending through the fourteenth. It is my considered belief that such a structure is ill advised.” Not surprisingly, in April 1953 the Filbey Committee thereupon released a report which recommended that the control of the curriculum leading to the B.A. degree be removed from the exclusive authority of the College faculty. In the future, the B.A. degree would be “relocated” by converting it into a joint degree that would be shared with the faculties of the various graduate divisions, with each side obtaining control over approximately half of the undergraduate’s four-year program. This decision was tantamount to killing off the original “Hutchins College” and was seen to be so by all concerned.

In a famous commentary denouncing the move as characteristic of the “post-Hutchins Thermidor,” political scientist Morton Grodzins argued that

[t]he root cause of the College’s excellence is the fact that scholars of outstanding ability have taken their full time to develop, test, and improve a general education program. Their work has produced a curriculum solidly based on educational theory and remarkably sound in content. The action recommended effaces the philosophy of the College and mutilates its program. . . .
Chicago as a leader of general education is being asked to become a pale imitation of itself, to abandon its followers [across the nation] and to abdicate its leadership, at the very threshold of victory for its original cause.

This was, moreover, an era of strange alliances and coalitions, stranger perhaps than one might first imagine. For example, during the tense months of the winter and spring of 1953 when the Filbey Report was being considered, one senior social scientist wrote to Fred Eggan—who was the Social Science Division’s representative on the task force—urging him to vote against Kimpton’s plan and for retaining the Hutchins College curriculum. Why? Because, according to this gentleman, “the Division is not interested in acquiring responsibility for the administration of programs leading to a Bachelor’s degree. If the other Divisions or the Professional Schools wish to work out arrangements that will give them control over the last year or two of an undergraduate curriculum leading to a Bachelor’s degree, I am confident that this Division would still prefer to articulate its programs of graduate instruction with a baccalaureate program of general education under the responsibility of the College.” It thus seems that the motives of at least some of the divisionally oriented faculty in supporting the status quo were not necessarily (or at least not only) based on their estimation of the quality of the educational practices of the late Hutchins Era, but rather also on the convenience of having a separate College faculty, so that they—the graduate researchers—could devote their time to graduate instruction.

The second installment of Kimpton’s strategy came in 1957–58 and was a necessary, if unplanned-for, modification of the first. The system of individually negotiated treaties between the graduate departments and the College that had been prescribed by Filbey in 1953 had quickly
proven to be a failure. Rather than willing and happy cooperation, observers saw endless wrangling and turf wars, the final outcome of which was that some College students found themselves being forced to take almost five years of courses in order to fulfill both the demands of the College and their respective departments. A committee chaired by historian Charles Mowat reported in 1957 that “too many students are being held for requirements extending their programs beyond four years.” Another report by Dean of Students Robert Strozier observed that “not only are their [the new joint degree programs’] elements not adequately fused, but their differences, where the components might be expected to be common, are a source of irritation and confusion.” Going back to the drawing boards in April 1957, Kimpton appointed another committee, chaired this time by himself, to sort out these clashes. The Executive Committee on Undergraduate Education (ECUE) proposed in May 1958 that sole control over the content and structure of the B.A. be returned to the College but that the faculty of the College be almost doubled in size by adding ninety-one members selected from the divisions, with the expectation that in the future the normal appointment paradigm would involve joint appointments between the College and a division. Rather than divide the undergraduate program in two parts—Filbey’s scheme of 1953—the plan of 1958 proposed what amounted to a slow but deliberate takeover by the divisional faculties of the College faculty itself. The old College of the 1940s and early 1950s would now be replaced with a “new College,” where two years of general education plus two years of specialization and electives would become the curricular norm and where power would be lodged in a “new” faculty which would increasingly consist of those who held co-divisional appointments.

A correlative, third goal of the Kimpton administration is not so well known, and that is the fact that Lawrence Kimpton hoped to
expand his newly redesigned College to make it the largest demographic component of the University of Chicago. In March 1954, Kimpton went before key members of the Board of Trustees with a plan to increase the size of the College from its then 1,350 students to 5,000 students by the mid-1960s, thus making the College 50 percent of the total University population.\textsuperscript{2} Even this number was something of a compromise, since Kimpton privately stated to his closest colleagues that he really wanted 6,000 undergraduates on the Quadrangles. Kimpton argued that

\[ \text{[t]he enrollment is really the key to the whole problem. The faculty, including all assistants and research men, number 1,200 at the present time with an enrollment of 4,800, which means roughly four to one in faculty ratio—better than the finest private schools in the country. This points the way to increase enrollment without increasing sharply any operation expenses or increasing the faculty. One thousand more students would produce} \]

\textsuperscript{2} Lawrence Kimpton’s hope for a substantial increase in undergraduate enrollment was obviously fueled by the evident demographic fact that in the later 1950s and 1960s the potential national applicant pool for four-year institutions burgeoned, as did the actual enrollments of many leading colleges. For example, Yale went from 3,171 students in 1939 to 4,586 in 1969, whereas Princeton went from 2,441 in 1939 to 3,260 in 1969. During the same thirty-year period Chicago declined from 3,144 in 1939 to 2,338 in 1969. It is extremely important to understand that such a perspective of comparativeness informed the critical deliberations of the University administration in 1953–54. In 1953 Kimpton commissioned a report on student enrollment trends that was strongly comparative in nature—using information on trends at Columbia, Harvard, and Northwestern, as well as various state universities—and which concluded that “[s]ince 1947 our enrollment has decreased more rapidly than elsewhere. These facts suggest that Chicago is faced with a genuine enrollment problem, that is, that our loss in enrollment cannot be fully explained by the factors that have tended to depress enrollment at other colleges and universities.” Kimpton brought this statistical information to the full Board of
$700,000 in student fee income and would help eliminate the deficit we are discussing.

One Trustee, John Nuveen, rephrased Kimpton’s logic precisely when he argued in August 1956 that “[t]he importance of increasing undergraduate enrollment can be recognized by observing that the addition of 1,000 cash customers who will remain, on the average, for four years is approximately $2,760,000 in tuition.” But it is important to note that Nuveen, like Kimpton, was worried not only about short-term financial gain, but about longer-term structural consequences, for he continued: “If it were merely numbers, the problem could be considered temporary, but it is obvious that in recent years many top universities have been making extraordinary efforts to secure top students from high schools.” Why so? Because, according to Nuveen, there was a market for superior college graduates in the business world and in the professions, and employers would surely be supportive of colleges which provided talented graduates.

Trustees, arguing in May 1954 that “[w]hat that means is that Chicago gained less in terms of post-war enrollment than any of these other comparable institutions and it has lost far more as the post-war years receded. These are very serious figures indeed because they show how we look in relation to the institutions with which we compare ourselves.” After noting that Chicago found itself in 1953 in the situation of having 1,612 undergraduate students and 2,830 graduate students, Kimpton then argued as follows: “Now, let me show you the importance of this. It happens to be the case that it costs about ten times as much to educate a graduate student as an undergraduate. The economics of this thing, I think, are fairly clear. If you train a Ph.D. it probably costs somewhere between ten and twelve thousand dollars per graduate student. . . . The undergraduate situation is the opposite. You have a class of thirty to fifty in the lectures. You have less well paid people teaching at that level so that, in effect, you make money at the undergraduate level and you lose money at the graduate level. I think that the moral of this is clear. On the basis of economics we cannot continue to have this kind of ratio [of undergraduate to graduate students] that we now have.”
Moreover, there was a powerful alumni fundraising dimension, for Nuveen argued that “[t]here are also long-range advantages of even greater potentiality since those who have demonstrated leadership in high school stand a better chance of being leaders in life, achieving greater financial success, and thus becoming more potent alumni donors.”

It is thus evident that the University’s leadership hoped that a larger College would benefit the University financially in the short term, but in even more significant ways over the longer run. Nor were fiscal issues absent in the many deliberations on the curriculum, for Kimpton’s ecue report of 1958 explicitly invoked the specter of a larger College as one of the justifications for its proposed changes, arguing “[t]he undergraduate student body is expected to grow substantially during the next few years.”

In spite of all of the efforts undertaken during the 1950s to improve admissions, to balance the curriculum, and occasionally even to improve faculty morale, the College struggled to break beyond a total four-year enrollment of barely more than 2,000 students. By the Autumn Quarter of 1961 we had reached a total enrollment of 2,183 students, a far cry from the optimistic projections of the mid-1950s. Indeed, the most potent problem facing the College in the later 1950s was its huge dropout rate. For example, of the 476 first-year students who matriculated in the autumn of 1958, no less than 113 (or 24 percent) of these students failed to return to the College in the fall of 1959. Losses of admitted transfer students were even more disastrous. Granted that Kimpton and many faculty members had worked hard to improve our admissions procedures, it seemed impossible to avoid losing students once they arrived here. Why was this the case?

3. Kimpton’s frustrations with the continued high dropout rate—which posed a grave threat to his hopes for expanding the size of the College—were apparent
Part of the problem was the miserable state of our residential facilities. In a comprehensive report on residential life (or lack thereof) at Chicago, Eugene Northrop argued in 1952 that “the chief concern of the College faculty at the present time is how to make its students civilized though well educated.” To accomplish this balance, Northrop thought it was imperative that the faculty move beyond wrangling over the curriculum and direct its attention to a “fuller academic life,” which would include living in well-designed residential colleges, each of which would have a resident master, faculty fellows, and faculty associates. A proposal advocating a “residential plan for the College” was actually debated and approved with great enthusiasm by the College faculty in the spring of 1952, and it was strongly endorsed by the then Dean of the College, F. Champion Ward. Unfortunately, the idea came forward during the budget-slash ing milieu to which I referred above, and it stalled, for the central administration felt unable to commit the necessary financial resources. As Kimpton put it to Ward, “All we lack is money and students. As soon as we get our budget into decent shape and as soon as we can convince a few more students to enroll, let’s roll up our sleeves and build more stately mansions.” Ward replied that this decision was “a severe blow to the Faculty’s hopes.”

in an exchange with Alan Simpson, Dean of the College, in early 1960. Preliminary indications in late 1959 of a yet increased rate had apparently led Kimpton to express in several public meetings his fears about a possible “declining enrollment in the College.” When cautioned by Simpson that “[d]rop-out rates are of deep concern to all of us, and we are collecting all the information we can about both the figures and the reasons. My only plea is that we do not spread alarm on the basis of misleading statistics before we know what the situation is,” Kimpton then responded: “I am sorry I touched off so quickly—indeed too quickly—on the apparent increase in dropouts. It is a subject that worries me so much that I became too impulsive.”
Nor can it be said that morale among the faculty was much better by the end of the decade. Writing in 1959, Bob Streeter, who had recently stepped down as Dean of the College, complained that “[t]he College is also conspicuous for the scandalous inadequacy of the buildings and facilities with which its work is carried on. It is unlikely, for example that the humanistic arts are taught at any other college in the country in an environment as dingy, malodorous, cramped, crumbling, and hideous as Lexington Hall. . . . It seems improbable that other respectable institutions can match the overcrowding and squalor of the offices occupied by most College faculty members.” Upon becoming Dean of the College in the late spring of 1959, Alan Simpson would remark that “I toured the College domain yesterday—I can only say that I never saw a sterner triumph of mind over matter. There are offices with as little space for reflection and as little light as a public toilet. There are classrooms as grim as a morgue. Diogenes in his tub was a sybarite compared with the asceticism we practice here.”

And there was a third and less targetable issue, one that often appears in various diagnostic reports prepared by senior administrators as well as by faculty leaders, which had to do with the College’s general environment. Issues involving student culture were of great interest to our colleagues. As early as October 1951, William Bradbury had submitted a comprehensive report to College leaders on “Education and Other Aspects of Personal Growth in the College Community” in which he argued that

[m]ore and more of us are wondering to what extent our partial neglect of the curriculum’s emotional consequences and of the non-curricular aspects of student life (however necessary this economizing of attention may once have been) has allowed conditions to develop which interfere with our highest objectives,
or has prevented us from exploiting elements of the larger environment which could enhance their attainment.

Similarly, in May 1952, the Committee on Policy and Personnel in the College urged that the University take “systematic account of a wider arc of the activities and experiences of its undergraduates, especially the younger of them, than it has in the past.” It would be tempting to put all the blame on the neighborhood or inadequate dorms, but Bob Streeter may have put his finger on it when he once observed that our prescribed general education system, based on year-end comprehensive exams, ironically privileged great intellectual autonomy and independence—freedom—but that for some College students such freedom could turn out to be an occasion for a kind of benign neglect.

Nor did everyone agree that this was merely a question of too much academic-style anomie, for one finds in several of Alan Simpson’s speeches and commentaries from the late ’50s and early ’60s a gentle rebuke to his fellow faculty colleagues that, in dealing with the seventeen-to twenty-year-olds in their College, they seemed to be only concerned with fostering intellectual intensity and not in educating what in modern-day parlance might be called “well rounded people.” Indeed, the College’s putative lack of concern with the whole person became a personal hobbyhorse for Simpson, who had begun his Deanship in May 1959 with an unusual press release asserting that “[w]e have also asked ourselves if beauty and brawn do not deserve a place on our campus as well as brains. The idea is not to lower our standards, but to attract a greater variety of Americans who are qualified to meet them. The ordinary American boy, who will only make a million later in life, the ordinary American girl, who wants a husband as well as a diploma, are as welcome here as the quiz kid.” And again in September 1960, asking rhetorically what an
A MEMBER OF THE WIDER UNIVERSITY

Educated man looked like: “He not only has the abrasive independence which is the typical hallmark of a Chicago education, but some graces, some style, some humor, and some facility for mixing with people.” One can easily mock such statements, even allowing for Simpson’s gender-based anachronisms. In fact, the Maroon had a veritable field day with Simpson’s first quote, solemnly announcing that “the campus has the right to expect its administrators and public spokesmen to present an accurate picture of the University, an institution where the central interests of the students have always been and always will be motivated by a desire to think, learn, and reason well.” But what Simpson perhaps wanted to say was that the College needed, then and now, to think of its mission as educating human and humane persons and not merely sentient minds. If, as James Newman once insisted, a John Stuart Mill redivivus would find the University of Chicago to be the most congenial of American universities, let us remember that Mill enjoyed a rebirth of aesthetic life and intellectual courage in response to a personal crisis. Perhaps it is too much to ask that both Mill and Wordsworth would find the College congenial, but it bears consideration.

THE BEADLE-LEVI ERA

In March 1960, Lawrence Kimpton announced, quite unexpectedly, that he would resign as Chancellor. The University would thus enter the new decade—which was to prove a most fateful decade indeed—with new leadership. In January 1961, George Beadle succeeded Kimpton as President, but to anyone who reads the published or unpublished records from the 1960s it is apparent that Beadle’s newly appointed Provost, Edward Levi, was the real educational leader of the
University at the time. Levi brought to the job a unique combination of ferocious insight about and love for the University, and a deep respect for and understanding of the work of the College, which after all was his own alma mater, since he had graduated from the Chicago College in 1932.

Yet, as I will show, although Kimpton had moved on and new leaders had taken his place, Kimpton’s concerns about the College, both as an educational vehicle and as a central component of the University’s financial well-being, continued unabated well into the next decade.

It is clear from the minutes of the meetings of the Board of Trustees and the debates in the Council of the Senate that the new leaders saw themselves as facing a very troubled situation in 1961–62. Kimpton and his administrative team had done magnificent work in stabilizing the neighborhood; in reconnecting the University with city business elites, connections which had apparently suffered considerably during the last part of the Hutchins administration; and in completing a $29-million capital campaign. And Kimpton left office with the conviction that he had saved much of the heritage of the Hutchins Era general-education model in the College while making prudent compromises with the divisional lobbies and engineering the possibility for closing the gap between the College and divisional faculties. Perhaps most importantly, the University budget was precariously balanced, but balanced nonetheless.

But the University had continued to sustain serious faculty losses in the later 1950s, and Kimpton’s plans for a larger College had gone virtually nowhere in the face of the dreadful attrition rates. As Levi put it soberly in February 1965:

[i]n the ’50s there was a kind of grimness of the City, a kind of grimness of the Campus, and to that I would add there were old buildings, inadequate buildings, the College was having great
difficulty, the drop-out rate was very high—probably higher than 50%—and in addition the University, I think it has to be said, was in many areas somewhat unpopular, and this unpopularity has to be overcome. Between 1950 and 1959 there was a real flight of faculty from the University, flight at a time when in most areas—not in all of them—it was extremely difficult to make top appointments to replace people who left.

With Beadle’s and the Board’s support, Levi moved quickly and dramatically to turn the faculty hiring situation around, which of necessity meant that by 1964 the University was again struggling under significant budget deficits—the spiral of desperation again, but in reverse. Levi was particularly sensitive to the need for robust investments in faculty salaries and in encouraging the departments to pursue bold, aggressive hiring policies. In April 1963, he argued to the Board of Trustees that “because of the a) many offers being made to our faculty personnel, b) the neighborhood problem, c) the fact that the University has slipped, and d) the University’s other kinds of unique and unusual problems, it is necessary that the University pay higher salaries than any other academic institution in the country if it is to regain its previous position of leadership.” Perhaps the best symbol of Levi’s audacious, if still untested, confidence was the new program of ten University Professorships, first formulated in June 1962, which was designed to bring to Chicago internationally notable scholars at (for the time) outrageously high salaries. For all his genuine regard for and uncompromising support for the College, Edward Levi’s overall concern was directed toward sustaining the prestige and strength of the research University.

But, and this is perhaps my second surprise of the afternoon, neither George Beadle nor Edward Levi were inclined to give up on Lawrence
Kimpton’s ambitions for a big or least bigger College. Reporting to the Board of Trustees on his plans for the future of the College in October 1964, Levi observed that “it is anticipated that student enrollment will climb from the present 2,200 to 4,000 over the next 10-year period.” That is, Levi wanted to double the size of the College between 1964 and 1975. According to the transcript of the meeting, the Trustees found Levi’s proposed plan to be “an exciting and beguiling one.” In fact, the central administration was sufficiently convinced of the plausibility of such a bold increase in student enrollment that the figure of 4,000 undergraduates became a critical planning variable for the University’s submission to the Ford Foundation in May 1965, requesting a $25-million unrestricted matching grant and outlining a ten-year plan of general goals for the development of the University from 1965 to 1975.

Beyond the level of strategic planning, Levi’s most concrete intervention involving the College came when Alan Simpson resigned to take up the Presidency of Vassar College and Levi was appointed to succeed Simpson pro tem as Acting Dean of the College. In the years 1962–63, Alan Simpson and others had pushed the idea that the College should be subdivided for curricular and governance purposes into what they called “multiple colleges.” Concerned with what he perceived to be a “lack of inventiveness in a college that prides itself on being experimental,” Simpson argued in March 1963 that

[w]e have all been to a good restaurant and found the table d’hote so excellent that we’ve returned to it several times. But who, that knows the difference between a good dinner and a bad dinner, would not trust himself to the a la carte?

In plain language, if we adopt multiple colleges, there will be some common learning and some variety, and the alternatives
will be framed by people who know the possibilities of good food and the relishes of different palates.

The Hutchins College was one way of organizing the resources of the kitchen. But if Hutchins and Faust were with us today, they would certainly be looking for other ways. The idea of dining forever off the *table d’hôte* of 1944–52 would strike them as very unenterprising. If it is of any moment, Faust, Hutchins, and Kimpton have all expressed a friendly interest in the possibilities of multiple colleges. Our pluralism of resources and interests seems to them to be something which we should now be exploiting.

In spite of Simpson’s invocation of the approbation of Robert Maynard Hutchins himself, his scheme for multiple colleges ran into a band saw of faculty opposition, arising both from turf-based particularism and from legitimate doubts about whether such a plan would fragment the undergraduate experience. By October 1963, Alan Simpson was convinced that his plan had gone down in failure, but in August of 1964 Edward Levi proceeded, as if by provostial magic, to resurrect it and to push it in a revised form through the College faculty later the same year.

Levi’s reasons for implementing this model—what we now call the Collegiate Divisions—were most certainly driven by his conviction that it would be desirable to have, as he put it, “a kind of federalized educational program of five separate, but interdependent areas concerned with the four-year undergraduate program.” But it is also clear that curricular flexibility was not the only reason, for Levi reported to the Board in 1963 that “if five or six programs can be developed with a faculty for each program serving approximately 400 students then the opportunity would be created a) for further growth and b) of placing upon different
faculties the responsibility for innovating and developing programs and recruiting from the Divisions and elsewhere the teaching personnel that was required.” Levi subsequently observed in 1965 that “it is assumed that the College enrollment will about double, moving from 2,100 to 4,000 within the ten years, but the plans for the reorganization of the College into collegiate divisions will preserve the small college flavor important to students, despite the doubled enrollment.”

Ed Levi’s and George Beadle’s hopes for a larger and stronger College also found concrete expression in the campus planning exercise undertaken by the Faculty Advisory Committee on Student Residences and Facilities, chaired by Walter Blum, a distinguished law professor and a long-time Levi friend. The Blum Report clearly stated that “[i]n planning for residence halls or houses for unmarried students, the Committee was instructed by the Administration to assume that some 2,800 additional spaces would be needed by the end of the decade.” If one calculates beds to be built with the numbers of students who would presumably be sleeping in them, it is clear that Walter Blum was also assuming that in ten years the University of Chicago would have a College of approximately 4,000 students. To obtain this objective the committee outlined a bold, and sometimes all-too-detailed plan to expand our facilities, beginning with an unorthodox, if candid admission that the University had just built two sub-standard residence halls: “It is of the utmost importance that the University at least keep pace with the quality of housing for unmarried students which has been (and is being) built at other schools of the highest quality. . . . Unfortunately, the last two residences built by the University—Pierce Tower and Woodward Court—suffer badly in comparison with housing built by other schools with which the University competes for students.”

To read the Blum Report today is to read a chronicle of our often subpar housing resources, and the significant lack of other amenities
as well. As Blum subsequently put it in his rather blunt manner:

[i]t is worth repeating that the University, and especially the College, is in direct and vigorous competition for students with [other] institutions which have made great strides in providing housing that serves to humanize school life and that promotes a combination of privacy for the individual and the support of a proper peer group. A well run Burton-Judson can be a drawing card; a repainted room in some Hyde Park hotel is not likely to attract students and is more likely to repel their parents.

Nor were we exactly rich in other amenities. Blum observed of the closing of Hutchinson Commons in 1965 that it is true that the Commons was not enjoying wide popularity as an eating place when it was shut down, and today the C-Shop, which is usually full to capacity at noon, is frequently deserted. The Committee believes, however, that it is wrong to interpret these facts as indicating that there is no demand for a student center at 57th and University. At the time the Commons was closed, it had deteriorated into an over institutionalized eating place which specialized in trying to cut expenses, and overall student enrollment was considerably lower than at present. The C-Shop now has become an unattractive room which houses food-dispensing machines of fierce appearance.

But the problems faced by the College in the early- and mid-1960s did not lie only in too few bricks and too little mortar, and in food dispensing machines of fierce appearance. In an extremely insightful, but
also confidential report to George Beadle in 1963, James Newman, an Assistant Dean of Students in the University, appraised the strengths of the College, but also its weaknesses:

the student in the College of the University of Chicago lives in a very special kind of social milieu. Its openness, its diversity, its large horizons, its lack of group pressures toward conformity present the student with a challenge to be himself, to be tolerant of others, and to live comfortably in a free and open world. This is a priceless asset. This society also demands of the student a kind of self-reliance and self-sufficiency that is not in keeping with the realities of human nature or of the normal social community. I am convinced that people need to live in a manageable world, that they need a sense of belonging to a community, that they need status and rewards. Few adults would choose to live in a social milieu which offers as little emotional support to the individual as does the College. Yet our students endure this psychological assault at a time in their lives when they are most in need of the social support that is lacking here.

As in the 1950s, the obstacles to achieving a larger College must have been daunting. Still, even with all of these apparent disabilities, considerable progress began to be made on the admissions front by the mid-1960s. The applicant pool began to inch up, perhaps as much because of the huge growth in the national pool of college-going youths as because of our own marketing efforts. By 1966, George Beadle could proudly report to the Board of Trustees that College enrollments were increasing “more rapidly than predicted in the Ford Profile.” By the fall of 1968, the College had reached a size of 2,600 students, a level not seen since the late 1940s.
Ur story has, however, a sad penultimate chapter and a more optimistic, if slow and in our time still-evolving finale. The administration’s bold plan in 1964 to double the size of the College by 1975, as presented to the Ford Foundation, ran straight into the maw of the enormous crisis faced by the University and the College in the later 1960s. I speak, of course, of the era of student unrest, not only of the sit-in of January 1969, but the atmosphere of distrust and mistrust that the whole era seemed to engender. Equally important, I speak of the incapacity of the University to provide sufficient resources like new dorms, together with the College’s continuing problems in providing a sufficiently welcoming and supportive environment to sustain even a College of 2,600 students. With considerable candor and great courage, Dean Wayne Booth observed in the spring of 1969 that “[t]oo many first-year students at Chicago have again this year been reported as miserable in their quarters, uninspired in their instruction, and unrenewed by their extracurricular life.”

Hence it was perhaps neither surprising nor unexpected when the College Council voted in March 1969 to recommend that the University reduce the size of the entering first-year class from 730 to 500 students for the academic year 1969–70. The consequences of this decision were immediately apparent. Whereas in 1966 the Office of the Dean of Students estimated that the College would have no less than 3,000 students by the 1970–71 academic year, in fact by that year annual enrollments in the College had plummeted to 2,212 students. The nadir was reached in 1972–73 when we bottomed out at 2,079 students, only slowly beginning to climb back to mid-1960s levels by the later 1970s.
Set against those hard and difficult times is the enormous success of a series of Presidents, Provosts, Deans, Masters, Housing Directors, Deans of Students, Deans of Admissions, and other concerned faculty and staff members throughout the 1970s and 1980s in expanding our admissions pool, in providing better social resources and a more humane environment for our students, and in the ever more successful attention that we have been able to bring to the quality and variety of our academic programs.

How different is our world? Our first-year attrition rate is nowadays 9 percent—still far too high in my personal opinion, but a vast improvement over even the recent past. We have built no new dorms, but we do have the splendid Shoreland and other readapted properties which seem very popular with our students. Our admissions pool is larger, but we still accept far more of our applicants than most of our peers, and as in the 1950s and 1960s they tend to be needier than the student populations of our peers. Much has already been accomplished. But the findings of Susan Kidwell’s task force, as well as the results of Richard Taub’s research, reveal that we have a considerable way to go.

As I read the Newman Report of 1963 and think about the College of today, I believe that the intellectual/academic values associated with the place are still securely intact—perhaps they are even a bit stronger. Of the big ticket issues that so perplexed our predecessors, several have with the passage of time and memory become somewhat less acute. Forty years ago there may have been a single “new” College, but there were still two very different and mutually suspicious worlds of the College faculty and the divisional faculties. That gulf has almost disappeared, at least on formal levels, and most colleagues nowadays are seriously committed to both undergraduate and graduate education. However, it is an open question—admittedly a controversial, possibly even heretical one—if in fact the College has not lost something of its specialness by not having
a cadre of professors whose primary professional commitments are to liberal-arts teaching on the undergraduate level. It has become widely fashionable to dismiss this model, but I think we should be honest enough to realize that the great General Education tradition of which we are the proud custodians would never have come into existence without a separate College faculty.

Another way of putting this paradox is to tell a brief story. In my office I have a picture of Gerhard Meyer, one of the legendary teachers of the late Hutchins Era and a co-founder of several of our most famous Core courses. A younger colleague recently came into my office and, seeing the photo, complimented me on having such a nice picture of Richard von Weizsäcker, the former Federal President of Germany, who does indeed bear something of a resemblance to Gerhard Meyer. Upon hearing his comment, I could not help thinking that, having just turned fifty, I am probably one of the last and also the youngest members of the faculty ever to have met Gerhard Meyer, much less to have had direct contact with that generation of the founders of the Core. Would Gerhard Meyer or Christian Mackauer or Joe Schwab find today’s College congenial? Quite likely. But would today’s University be willing to hire and give tenure to someone like Gerhard Meyer or Christian Mackauer or Joe Schwab? I think that we all know the answer to that question.

What are we to make of the fact that we esteem and honor a system of education created by a collectivity of brilliant, passionately gifted teachers, but we do not honor the architects themselves sufficiently to be willing to replicate them? Let me be clear. I am not calling for a return to the days of a College-only faculty, which at this point in our history would have many more negative than positive consequences. Rather, I ask that the present occupants of the now matured and settled-in system of joint appointments—our generation of the “new” College faculty, you
and me—rededicate our efforts to protect and to strengthen that remarkable heritage of general education which, more than anything else, has come to define the special character of our College. Surely we owe not only to ourselves, but to those honored colleagues who preceded us, to prove that Morton Grodzins was wrong in his “Thermidor” speech of 1953, that is, to prove that we have both the will and the capacity to make, in Grodzins’ words, “the Chicago college exist and flourish, serving as a demonstration for those who would copy it well and as a rebuke to those who would copy it poorly.”

There is certainly much to be hopeful about. Since the 1960s and especially since the 1970s, relationships between the divisions and the College have become cordial and cooperative. The College is fully supportive of the highest scholarly standards for appointment and promotion, and the divisions have demonstrated in recent years a vastly increased attention to the instructional needs of our Collegiate programs. As far as the curriculum goes, we have seen both healthy continuity and healthy change, and I hope that the current review will lead us—in good Chicago fashion—to celebrate all of the good things about our current curricular practices, but also to empower us to return to the days when the College was proud of its capacity for experimentation and even for an occasional dose of revolution.

Nor are these issues without practical import as we move to expand the College by an additional 900 students. For we should only proceed to that level of enrollment—which will require entering classes of approximately 1,220 students each year (roughly 200 more than we matriculated this year)—if we can increase the current applicant pool of the College from its current range of 5,500 to somewhere between 8,000 and 9,000 solid, realistic applications from qualified students who know of and who want the special kind of education we offer. Such an increase
will allow us to increase our selectivity, to enhance still further the recruitment of gifted minority students, and to ensure that we are indeed what my German colleagues call a *Terminaluniversität*, a “destination university” for the great majority of our students.

To secure such an increase will certainly require powerful improvements in our marketing efforts, as well as strengthening the College’s communications message more generally, and enhancing our relationships with key alumni opinion groups. As indicated in the first part of my remarks today, we have already initiated a number of steps to do all of the above, and doubtlessly many of you will have additional good ideas for us to pursue.

But we must not lose sight of the fact that there is more to our current situation than marketing and communications can address. Some of our problems relate to woefully inadequate use of the campus itself as a self-representational tool, and I will discuss my hopes for a radically expanded program of activities for gifted high school students later in the year before the College Council. Others have to do with inadequacies in our facilities—the lack of attractive, state-of-the-art residence halls close to campus and of attractive athletic facilities is an enormous deficit, one which hurts us tremendously in our admissions efforts. But we will delude ourselves if we ignore the fact that the quality of academic life for students currently registered in the College presents us with some complex challenges. Unhappy or otherwise frustrated current students can hardly be relied upon to recommend with any credible enthusiasm that prospective students join their ranks.

Our predecessors worried greatly about all of these issues, and in worrying about them they often came to rhetorical blows over how to achieve the end of a liberally educated woman and man. It is remarkable that, amidst all of the radical changes in organization that we have
endured, each succeeding generation of colleagues has never doubted the legitimacy of that end as a defining mission for this University. And perhaps that is not altogether surprising, for I believe that the integrity of the liberal education that we have provided to our students has in fact been deeply owing to the special culture of the University of which the College is the natural center—that wonderful “nonsegmented” University of which Edward Levi was so proud.

Forty years from now, when future leaders of the University look back on our work, when we in turn have the dubious honor of being studied as historical objects, those who come after us will judge us less on how many students we admitted, or on how many dorms we built, or on how many outside offers we were able to fend off, or how many new research centers we sustained, although all of those are relevant issues, and, as I have tried to show today, they have always been seen to be messily interrelated issues. The work of a research university of world stature and standing, indeed a liberal-arts college of world stature and standing, costs money and lots of it. There is no virtue that I know of for a university or college of the first rank to be poor or to live on the margins of financial insecurity.

No, in the end we will be judged on whether we sustained those values which James Newman so admired thirty-three years ago—a general respect of intellectual life and participation in it; a seriousness of purpose; the undergraduate community as characterized by a critical attitude; and a tolerance of diversity and a respect for individuality—and whether in doing so we were able to provide a supportive social, as well as a rigorous academic, environment in which our College students could thrive and prosper. Some of this must require a thoughtful and decisive look at our academic programs, enhancing what is good and changing what is not good. Much will also depend on our willingness to invest in physical
resources that are long overdue, not only a first-class athletics center, but new residence halls of high quality; a real, adequately sized student center; proper research and laboratory facilities, especially for the Physical Sciences and for Regenstein Library; and the capacity to develop programs—internships, research opportunities, foreign study opportunities—that any top-ranked college should have in abundance.

Ultimately, the most critical variable will be our personal as well as our collective commitment as a faculty to the intellectual and personal welfare of our College students, seen not as an anonymous mass of faces but as creative, responsive, and ambitious individuals. As Bob Streeter argued almost fifty years ago, “[c]oncern for the well-being and academic progress of individual students may be the single most important means to enhancement of the social and intellectual milieu of college students generally.” That commitment and that concern was never in doubt for the generations of faculty colleagues in the College gone by. Let it not be in doubt for our generation as well.

I wish you a happy, prosperous, and intellectually and politically lively academic year, and I thank you for your strong and consistent support for the vital work of the College.
THE COLLEGE OF THE UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO